Governance of the Workplace: The Contemporary Regime of Individual Contract by Dau-Schmidt, Kenneth G. & Haley, Timothy A.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2007
Governance of the Workplace: The Contemporary
Regime of Individual Contract
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, kdauschm@indiana.edu
Timothy A. Haley
Indiana University Maurer School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dau-Schmidt, Kenneth G. and Haley, Timothy A., "Governance of the Workplace: The Contemporary Regime of Individual Contract"
(2007). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 168.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/168
GOVERNANCE OF THE WORKPLACE: THE
CONTEMPORARY REGIME OF INDIVIDUAL
CONTRACT
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidtt and Timothy A. Haleytt
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last three decades, the American labor market has
undergone a dramatic transformation that has heralded enormous
change in the governance of the workplace. The development of new
information technology and the rise of the global economy have
decentralized firm decisionmaking and brought the market into the
firm in ways that have not previously been experienced.1 These
changes have made possible a new flexibility in many production
methods allowing the vertical disintegration of firms,
compartmentalization of production, and the outsourcing of work on
the global market. Firms can now organize production on a global
scale, coordinating parts production with suppliers from across the
globe, assembling engines and transmissions in Asia, and doing final
assembly in consumer countries, using subcontracted or temporary
labor.2 As a result, the paradigmatic employment relationship in the
United States and other developed countries has moved away from a
long-term relationship governed by internal labor market rules within
a centralized managerial structure, toward a short-term relationship
t Willard and Margaret Carr Professor of Labor and Employment Law, Indiana
University, School of Law-Bloomington. B.A. 1978, University of Wisconsin-Madison; M.A.
1981, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, J.D. 1981, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, Ph.D.
(Economics) 1984, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor.
tt Associate, Barnes & Thornburg, LLP, B.A. 2002, University of North Carolina-
Raleigh; J.D. 2006, Indiana University, School of Law-Bloomington.
1. PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET-DRIVEN
WORKFORCE (1999).
2. Jane Slaughter, Modular Assembly: The Ultimate in 'Contracting Out' Comes to North
American. LABOR NOTES 8 (May 1999).
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governed by international labor markets in a decentralized managerial
structure.3
This transformation in the labor market has contributed to the
decline of union representation in America. The decline of
hierarchical management and the role of internal labor market rules
has robbed unions of some of their traditional function of
representing employees within this hierarchy. Indeed, the new
systems of decentralized management, employee involvement, and
subcontracting, combined with some very generous Supreme Court
interpretations of the "managerial" and "supervisory" exemptions
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)" have left from 31-
40% of employees uncovered by the Act.5 At the same time, the rise
of the global labor market and the movement of manufacturing jobs
overseas has undermined unions' bargaining power. American unions
are representing less and less people, and bringing less clout to bear at
the bargaining table. As a result, more and more American workers
find themselves in a system of workplace governance based on
individual contract within a context of common law rules and state
and federal legislation rather than collective bargaining.
Moreover, the development of the new information technology,
the rise of the global economy, and the corresponding decline of
unions has led employers to negotiate or impose different terms in
individual employment contracts. With the decline of long-term
employment, employers have sought to protect their investments in
training and intellectual property by requiring covenants not to
compete and "follow-on" clauses, while attaining greater flexibility in
the employment relationship by reducing expectations of job tenure
and deferred benefits. Additionally, as union representation has
declined in the private sector, employee litigation has come to loom
large in the minds of employers and they have turned to alternative
methods of dispute resolution to avoid litigation and communicate
with their employees even in the absence of a union. In particular, the
practice of arbitration pursuant to individual employment contracts,
or "employment arbitration," has grown, encouraged by legislation
and court decisions favoring the procedure.
3. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and Technology:
Implications for Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1 (2001).
4. See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
5. Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe, Introduction and Overview, in EMPLOYMENT
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKERS RIGHTS IN THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 1-26
(Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe eds., 1999).
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Finally, perhaps in response to the decline of employee rights in
the new economic regime, in recent years there has been a modest
erosion of the traditional common law doctrine of employment at will
that undergirds the American system of individual contract. In the
last three decades, courts in many jurisdictions have developed
common law exceptions to the employment at will doctrine for
discharges in violation of public policy, public duty, implied contract,
and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. At the same
time, many state legislatures have passed statutes protecting
employees from discharge in certain cases. These common law and
statutory exceptions have circumscribed an outline of basic common
law protection against the worst abuses of employer power in the
system of individual contract.
In this essay, we will set forth an empirical outline of the
contemporary individual contract regime of workplace governance in
the United States. Because of the breadth and diversity of the
individual contract regime, this description cannot be exhaustive. We
focus almost exclusively on what is known about the contents of
individual contracts for employment and recent common law and
statutory restrictions on the employment at will doctrine. Where
appropriate we will make comparisons with the employee rights and
procedures that exist under workplace governance through collective
bargaining. In this way we hope to provide a brief description of what
is currently known about the contours of this regime and how it varies
from the regime of collective bargaining in order to provide a basis
for further research.
II. TERMS OF THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
Freeman and Medoff (F&M) hypothesized that individual
contract negotiations will result in fundamentally different contractual
rights in the workplace than the exercise of collective voice in union
negotiations.6 The formation of a union changes which workers the
employer responds to in negotiating the terms and conditions of
employment In the world of individual bargaining, the employer
responds to the interests of the "marginal worker" who is most likely
to leave for another employer-a worker who is young and mobile.
However, under collective bargaining, the union must satisfy the
interests of the majority of its members, and so the employer is asked
6. RICHARD FREEMAN & JAMES MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 10 (1984).
7. Id.
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to respond to the interests of the "median worker"-a worker of more
average characteristics for the represented workforce. In comparison
with the young and mobile marginal workers, the older median
worker is more likely to be interested in medical benefits, pension
benefits, and job security. Moreover, the exercise of collective voice
allows the employees to overcome information imperfections and
negotiate efficient contract terms such as job security and greater
protections for health and safety. Indeed the existence of an effective
union that can exercise effective voice and enforcement mechanisms
over an extended period of time can itself affect what rights the
employees ask for in collective negotiations. For example, job
security, job training, and deferred compensation provisions will all be
easier to enforce when the workers protect each other through
organization in a union. As a result, F&M predicted that organized
employees would enjoy higher levels of fringe benefits, job security,
and seniority protection than employees in nonunion workplaces and
presented empirical evidence that this was true.
A. An Overview of the Terms of Individual Employment Contracts
and Collective Bargaining Agreements
Table 1 reproduces the results of Galle and Koen's national
survey9 of the individual employment contract terms used by 123
companies in the year 2000. These contracts were generally written
for executives, managers, sales people, professional employees, and
technical employees who may have very different interests from the
employees traditionally protected under collective bargaining
agreements. Shop floor production and service employees in
nonunion plants generally have no written contract or are governed
by employer handbooks that expressly disclaim any legally binding
effect. ° Nevertheless it is interesting to examine Galle and Koen's
findings to get an idea of the concerns addressed in these individual
contracts for employment, and the solutions.
The results of Table 1 suggest that there is a great diversity in
individual contracts for employment, and that they primarily address
the employees' concerns about position, pay, and the conditions of
termination, and the employers' concerns about non-competition,
8. Id. at 20, 61-68, 115.
9. William P. Galle, Jr. & Clifford M. Koen, Reducing Post-Termination Disputes: A
National Survey of Contract Clauses Used in Employment Contracts, 9 J. INDIVIDUAL EMP. RTS.
227-41 (2000-2001).
10. See notes 117-25 infra.
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trade secrets, and limitations on liability. Only six terms make it into
a majority of the individual contracts: title (60%), salary (60%),
bonus (54%), other compensation (55%), termination of contract
(55%) and non-competition (55%). If one examines the terms that
are included in at least a third of the individual contracts, one would
have to add: terms of employment (duties) (42%), description of
responsibilities (39%), required notice of termination (34%), payment
upon separation (46%), trade secrets/proprietary information
protection (49%), and limitations on employer liability (40%). As
discussed below, although mandatory arbitration provisions appear in
only 20% of the individual employment contracts, this is a far greater
percentage than the minuscule percentage of such provisions prior to
the 1991 case of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation"
discussed below. Galle and Koen's survey results are consistent with
the predictions of economic theory in that they show a strong concern
with the interests of marginal workers (current responsibilities and
pay) and protecting the employer's interests in investment in the new,
more transient, labor market (non-competition, trade secrets and
employer liability).
The results of the Bureau of National Affairs survey of collective
bargaining agreements for the years 1971, 1986, and 1995 are set out
in Table 2. This table shows the percent of surveyed collective
bargaining agreements that included particular contract terms in each
year. Unfortunately the table cannot be extended beyond the
examined period because the Bureau of National Affairs ended this
useful survey in 1995. However, at least over the period 1971-1995,
the BNA survey indicates a remarkable consistency in the basic terms
of American collective bargaining agreements and a remarkable
stability in the that basic formulae over time.
The BNA survey of collective bargaining agreements shows
conformity with respect to the basic provisions of such agreements
usually in the high 80s or 90s of percentage. Although there is some
variation in the exact terms, almost all collective bargaining
agreements have just cause protection (97%), an arbitration
procedure (99%), life insurance (99%), a pension (99%), seniority
provisions (72%), paid time-off, occupational health and safety
provisions (89%), non-discrimination guarantees (89%), a union
security clause (99%), and a no-strike clause (94%).
11. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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Table 1








Wavier of Rights 13
Duties
Title 60
Terms of Employment 42











Required Notice of Termination 34
Termination of Contract 55
Consequences of Termination 31
Payment Upon Separation 46
Non-competition 55
Solicitation of Employees 25
Property Rights
Intellectual Property Rights 32
Ownership of Company-Supplied Resources 20
Trade Secrets/Proprietary Information
Limitation of Employer Liability 49
Acknowledge Sexual Harassment Policy
Consensual Relations Between Employees 8
Entire Agreement 1
Limitation of Employee Liability 40
Indemnification
Renegotiation or Change in Relationship 15
Alteration of Contract
Change of Ownership or Control 23
Conditions of Renewal 32
25
Source: William P. Galle, Jr. & Clifford M. Koen, Reducing Post-Termination
Disputes: A National Survey of Contract Clauses Used in Employment Contracts, 9 J.
INDIVIDUAL EMP. RTS. 227-41 (2000-2001).
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Table 2
Percent of American Collective Bargaining Agreements With Various Contract
Terms
Contract Term 1971 1986 1995 Trend
Industrial Jurisprudence
Just Cause 82 86 92 Up
Just Cause or Specific Offenses 92 94 97 Up
Grievance and Arbitration 94 99 99 Up/Level
Mediation and Conciliation 4 3 4 Level
Industrial Cooperation
Union/Mgt Cooperation Clause 21 45 60 Up
Joint Committees 14 24 20 Up/Level
Quality of Work Life Comm. n/a 4 8 Up
Occ. Safety & Health Comm. 31 49 53 Up
Restrictions on Management Rights
Subcontracting 35 54 55 Up
Supervisory Performance of Work 52 59 58 Level
Technological Change 14 25 26 Up
Plant Shutdown or Relocation 8 26 23 Up
Fringe Benefits
Life Insurance 70 96 99 Up
Hospitalization 67 79 30 Down
Major Medical 32 74 24 Down
Comprehensive Medical Ins 7 21 70 Up
Dental Insurance n/a 79 85 Up
Pension 87 99 99 Up/Level
Seniority and Job Security
Seniority Determine Layoffs 72 78 72 Level
Seniority Determine Promote 41 46 37 Down
Seniority Determine Transfer 21 40 62 Up
Guarantee of Work or Pay 5 13 16 Up
Severance Pay 34 41 39 Up/Level
Time-off (in days)
Median Num of Vacation Days 20 25 25 Up/Level
Median Number of Holidays 9 11 11 Up/level
Family Leave 31 36 36 Up/Level
Personal Leave 69 72 76 Up
Occupational Heath and Safety
Occupational Health and Safety 65 84 89 Up
Non-Discrimination
Race, Gender, National Origin 46 88 87 Up/Level
Union Affiliation and Support 40 41 58 Up
Union/Management Power
Union Security 83 99 99 Up/Level
No Strike 90 94 94 Up/Level
No Lock-out 81 90 89 Up/Level
Right to Recognize Pickets 14 28 25 Up/Level
Sources: BNA, Basic Patterns in Union Contracts (1971, 1986 and 1995). The BNA
sample consisted of 400 collective bargaining agreements from a cross section of
industries, unions, company sizes and geographic areas.
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Even the less commonly observed provisions of a union
management cooperation clause (60%) and limitations on sub-
contracting (55%) show consistency generally not found in the
individual employment contracts of Table 1. Consistent with the
economic theory, these provisions show a primary concern with the
interests of average workers in job security and benefits. They also
suggest that unions do indeed help workers address public good
problems such as health and safety. Issues such as the protection of
the employer trade secrets and customer lists through non-
competition clauses, which have loomed large in individual
employment contracts, do not appear in the BNA survey. In part, the
relative absence of these issues from collective bargaining agreements
is due to the fact that the managerial, professional, technical, and sales
people for which training costs, trade secrets, and customer lists are
important are either excluded from coverage of the NLRA
(managerial) or have traditionally not been organized. The lower
turnover rates among union employees may also ameliorate these
problems in union workplaces. It is also probably the case that few
self-respecting unions would ever agree to something as draconian as
a non-competition clause. However with the recent increases in
organizing among professional employees and the increased demand
by employers for such protections, it seems likely that, at least for
some employees, the problems of training costs and the protection of
employer intellectual property will become more important as an
issue in collective bargaining."2
As previously mentioned, the basic terms of American collective
bargaining agreements have remained remarkably stable over the
examined period. The biggest changes in the terms of collective
bargaining agreements over the period 1971-1995 appear to be that:
use of various employer/employee committees has increased,
provisions restricting management's right to subcontract or relocate
work have increased, unionized employees have switched from
hospitalization and major medical coverage to comprehensive medical
insurance, seniority plays a less important role in promotion and a
more important role in transfers, provisions regarding occupational
safety and health have increased, and provisions prohibiting employer
and union discrimination have become more common. Except for the
rather dramatic increases in the percent of contracts restricting
management rights to subcontract, adopt technological changes, and
12. N. Newman, Trade Secrets and Collective Bargaining: A Solution to Resolving Tensions
in the Economics of Innovation, 6 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1 (2002).
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shutdown or relocate the plant, there is little evidence in the BNA
survey of the turmoil that has existed in the employment relationship
in the last three decades. Apart from the BNA survey, there is
evidence that unions have begun to address some employee privacy
concerns raised by the new technology and changing employment
relationship. A Bureau of Labor Statistics study of 614 collective
bargaining agreements covering 1000 or more employees found that
380 of them, or 62%, had clauses covering some aspect of employee
privacy. The privacy concerns addressed in these clauses included:
the use of employment records, the use of medical records, drug
testing and the use of test results, workplace surveillance, and
employee privacy off of the job. Of the 380 contracts with privacy
clauses, 70% had clauses restricting the use of employee records and
25% had clauses restricting drug testing or the use of test results.
In summary, a comparison of Tables 1 and 2 suggest that
workplace governance under a regime of individual contract will lead
to much more variability in the terms of employment and terms of
employment that are much more in tune with the employer's interests
in flexibility and the protection of his or her investments than under a
regime of collective bargaining. The terms of individual employment
contracts specify not only the employee's salary and benefits, but also
the employer's rights to terminate the employee, retain intellectual
property rights and trade secrets, and be free of the employee's
competition after he or she leaves. The terms of collective bargaining
agreements show much more uniformity and focus much more on the
concerns of the average worker in job security, benefits, seniority, and
occupational health and safety. Even the issue of whether the parties
reduce their agreement to writing reflects this difference in concern.
Although organized employees almost always seek to achieve a
written contract, in the unorganized sector employees work without a
written contract when that meets the employer's needs, and tend to
achieve a written contract only when the employer has something to
protect such as investments in training, trade secrets, or intellectual
property. Because of the rise of the information technology and the
decline of long-term employment, the issue of employers' ability to
protect their investments in training, intellectual property, and trade
secrets has only grown in the last two decades. We will now examine
the available empirical data with respect to several specific and
important terms of employment in greater detail.
2007]
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B. At will Status and Management Discretion
Although comprehensive data is not available for all employees
with respect to job security and seniority protection, the data that is
currently available also supports F&M's analysis suggesting lower job
security for employees under the regime of individual contract.
Perhaps the best available data on the employment contract
provisions of nonunion employees with respect to job security was
obtained by Verkerke in a 1994 nationwide survey of 221 employers.13
Verkerke found that, in dealing with their employees on an individual
basis, 52% of employers expressly contracted for employment at will,
33% of employers used no documents specifying the standard for
discharge, and only 15% of employers expressly contracted for just
cause protection. In contrast, the 1995 Bureau of National Affairs
national survey of 400 collective bargaining agreements detailed in
Table 2 shows that 92% of the agreements expressly contracted for
just cause protection for the covered employees.14 The fact that so
many employers never specify the conditions for discharge with
respect to their nonunion employees while 97% of all collective
bargaining agreements specify just cause and/or specific grounds for
discharge15 is also consistent with F&M's argument that collective
voice will bring the formalization of work rules to the workplace in
order to limit employer discretion.
As previously discussed, even with the recent boom in nonunion
grievance and arbitration procedures, the best estimate is that today
only about 19% of nonunion employers contract for such
procedures. 6 By contrast, the Bureau of National Affairs survey
shows that, in 1995, 99% of American collective bargaining
agreements included a grievance and arbitration provision.17 With
respect to the relative importance of seniority in union and nonunion
workplaces, Kaufman and Kaufman, found that, given a worker's
ability to do the job, seniority became the decisive factor in the
determination of promotions in many more unionized than
nonunionized plants.18 Kaufman and Kaufman also found seniority
more important for layoff decisions in union plants than nonunion
13. J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts:
Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 837, 861-9 (1995).
14. BNA, BASIC PATFERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 7 (1995).
15. Id.
16. Galle & Koen, supra note 9.
17. BNA,supra note 14.
18. Robert S. Kaufman & Roger T. Kaufman, Union Effects on Productivity, Personnel
Practices, and Survival in the American Automotive Parts Industry, 8 J. LAB. RES. 332-50 (1987).
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plants, but the result was not statistically significant. More than 72%
of collective bargaining agreements in 1995 provided for seniority as a
determinative factor in layoffs, promotion, or transfer.' 9 Although
reliable figures on employers' use of seniority in making layoff and
promotion decisions regarding nonunion employees are not available,
it seems doubtful that the adherence to the practice in the nonunion
sector compares with that in the union sector.
There is an extensive literature on the impact of employee
organization on management practices.2' Although many of these
practices are conducted merely by management policy, at least in the
union sector, they undoubtedly also have an impact on employee
contractual rights. Several authors have found that unions limit
employer flexibility, for example in staffing practices 2' and the
assignment of work.2 Union contracts are more likely to contain
guarantees that particular work will be done by particular employees
in particular numbers. Such guarantees can have a negative impact on
firms' ability to adjust to changing technologies and economic
conditions. Another robust finding is that union employees enjoy
more training opportunities both on and off the job.23 This result may
obtain because union workers have higher wages and longer tenures
of employment, and so pose a better opportunity for investment in
training. 24 However, there is also evidence that unions actively pursue
training for their members with success.25 Employee organization has
been associated with the use of objective criteria in job evaluation and
the formalization promotion processes. 26 Although some of this may
be achieved through informal means, union contracts are much more
likely to specify the means of evaluation and the procedure for
transfer or promotion. Union workplaces are less likely to use
19. BNA,supra note 14, at 67.
20. Anil Verma, What Do Unions Do in the Workplace? Union Impact on Management and
HRM Policies, 26 J. LAB. RES. 415 (2005).
21. PAUL N. GOODERHAM & ODD NORDHAUG, FLEXIBILITY IN NORWEGIAN AND
BRITISH FIRMS: NEW CHALLENGES FOR EUROPEAN HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
(2000); Cynthia L. Gramm & John F. Schnell, The Use of Flexible Staffing Arrangements in Core
Production Jobs, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 245 (2000-2001).
22. Kaufman & Kaufman, supra note 18.
23. Sean Kennedy et al., The Effect of Trade Unions on the Provision of Training:
Australian Evidence, 32 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 565-80 (1994); Paul Osterman, Skill, Training and
Work Organization in American Establishments, 34 INDUS. REL. 125 (1995).
24. Wiji Arulampalam & Alison L. Booth, Training and Labor Market Flexibility: Is There
a Tradeoff?, 36 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 521 (1998).
25. Jason Heyes & Mark Stuart, Bargaining for Skills: Trade Unions and Training at the
Workplace, 36 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 459 (1998).
26. Ignace Ng & Dennis Maki, Trade Union Influence on Human Resource Management
Practices, 33 INDUS. REL. 121 (1994).
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variable pay plans. 27 Although unions are more likely to accept gain-
sharing programs based on objective criteria and group performance,
they seem to resist individual incentive plans based on employer
evaluations. 28 Finally, although union opposition can sometimes
interfere with the employer's communication of firm goals,29 the
presence of a union in the workplace is associated with a higher
incidence of employee communication through participation
programs and committees. 30
C. Fringe Benefits
Bureau of Labor Statistics data on the level of participation in
fringe benefits for private sector nonunion employees under
individual contract, and private sector union employees under
collective agreements, are presented in Table 3. These data show that
employees under the regime of individual contract achieve
significantly lower participation rates than union employees for all
benefits, except for long-term disability insurance and defined
contribution pension plans. In the year 2004, nonunion employees
had less coverage for life insurance, short-term disability insurance,
medical insurance, dental insurance, and vision insurance than their
union counterparts. The Bureau's statistics also show that nonunion
employees pay a higher percent of their insurance premiums than
union employees (20% to 11% in 2004 for medical insurance).
Although nonunion employees enjoyed the same participation rate'
with respect to defined contribution pension plans as union
employees, this parity is swamped by union employees' greater
participation in defined benefit plans. In the year 2004, only 47% of
nonunion employees participated in pension plans while 81% of union
employees participated in such plans. The fact that the majority of
nonunion employees who have pension plans are in defined
contribution plans while the majority of union employees who have
pension plans are in defined benefit plans is consistent with F&M's
analysis. The defined contribution plans prevalent among nonunion
employees are more portable, reflecting the employers' catering to the
needs of mobile marginal workers in individual bargaining. The
27. GORDON BETCHERMAN ET AL., THE CANADIAN WORKPLACE IN TRANSITION (1994).
28. Kaufman & Kaufman, supra note 18.
29. EDWARD COHEN-ROSENTHAL & CYNTHIA BURTON, MUTUAL GAINS: A GUIDE TO
UNION-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION (2d ed. 1993).
30. Irene Goll, Environment, Corporate Ideology, and Employee Involvement Programs, 30
INDUS. REL. 138 (1991); John Benson, Employee Voice in Union and Nonunion Australian
Workplaces, 38 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 453 (2000).
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defined benefit plans favored by union employees place the risk of
investment on the employer, reflecting union employees' greater
bargaining power.
Table 3
Percent of Nonunion and Union Employees in the Private Sector
Participating in Various Fringe Benefits 1999, 2000, 2004
Nonunion Employees Union Employees
Fringe Benefit
1999 2000 2004 1999 2000 2004
Insurance
Life Insurance 53 51 47 78 82 62
Short-term Disability Ins. 33 30 35 66 69 66
Long-term Disability Ins. 25 25 28 32 28 28
Medical Insurance 52 49 50 73 75 81
Dental Insurance 30 27 33 52 53 68
Vision Insurance 15 15 19 39 41 50
Pension
All Plans 44 44 47 79 83 81
Defined Benefit 16 13 15 70 69 69
Defined Contribution 35 36 42 39 38 42
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in Private Industry,
1999; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in Private Industry,
2000; Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey: Employee
Benefits in Private Industry in the United States, March 2004. Note that the
percentages for "Defined Benefit" and "Defined Contribution" plans do not
add up to the percentages for "All Plans" because some employees
participate in more than one type of pension plan.
D. Covenants Not-to-Compete and Intellectual Property
Although the decline of long-term employment has given
employers new flexibility and cost savings by shifting risk to
employees, it has also created a number of problems for employers.
Higher employee turnover raises evaluation, training, trade secret
enforcement, and monitoring costs. This problem has been
exacerbated by the recent decline in the number of employers who are
2007]
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willing to give informative references on former employees.31
Employer background checks and company records raise issues of
employee privacy. Short-term employees are also a poor investment
for job training because they often move on to the next job before the
employer can recoup his or her investment. Some employers have
begun to contract for the repayment of training costs if the employee
leaves within a certain period, or to ask for a non-competition
agreement, in order to minimize this problem.32 Other investments
that can be problematic for employers with high turnover are
customer lists or trade secret information. Employees who leave an
employer can take valuable information to a competitor, or perhaps
set up a competing firm themselves. Although it is not well
documented, there is a current trend in the American workplace for
employers to impose non-competition clauses on almost any
managerial, professional, technical, or sales employees who may have
firm information, to prevent them from working for competitors after
they leave the firm and potentially sharing what they know about the
employer's business.33 Finally, short-term employees need more
monitoring than long-term employees. Of necessity, they are paid on
the basis of current productivity without deferred compensation, and
because they know the relationship is short-term, they have less
disincentive to act opportunistically and shirk. The new information
technology has provided many new ways of monitoring employee
productivity, but surveillance and monitoring of communications once
again raises privacy concerns for employees.
E. Individual Agreements to Arbitrate
The Supreme Court's recent interpretations of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) have fostered, or even encouraged, the
adoption of individual grievance and arbitration procedures. Prior to
31. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and Technology:
Implications for Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1, 15-16 (2001).
32. Id. at 18-19.
33. A study by Peter Whitmore provides some indirect evidence of growing employer
reliance on non-compete agreements. In his study, Whitmore analyzes trends in the enforcement
of non-compete agreements in appellate courts between 1960 and 1980. In doing so, he notices
that the number of cases that appear before appellate courts in the 1980s is significantly higher
than the number of cases in the 1960s. Since "reported appellate decisions are only the tip of the
iceberg," Whitmore reasons that there is at least circumstantial evidence that Americans have
been increasingly utilizing non-competition agreements in employment contracts. Whitmore's
reasoning has been largely accepted as supporting the widely held belief that the use of non-
compete agreements and other employer protections have increased. Peter Whitmore, A
Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment Contracts, 15 J. CORP. L. 483, 484-
485 n.2, 7-8.
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the enactment of the FAA, agreements to submit a dispute to
arbitration were revocable by either party any time before a final
arbitration decision was rendered.34  Under this common law
"revocability doctrine," neither side could effectively compel
arbitration or stay litigation and at most only nominal damages in the
amount of the costs of preparing for arbitration were available for
breach. Courts reasoned that the parties could not knowledgeably
waive their right to litigate in advance of knowing what was at issue.
Even with the enactment of the pro-arbitration provisions of the FAA
in 1925, it was not clear that individual pre-dispute employment
arbitration agreements would be enforceable because it was not clear
that, in the FAA, Congress had intended to allow parties to submit
disputes over statutory rights to arbitration and section 1 of the FAA
seemed to exempt "contracts of employment." However, in the 1991
case of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation (Gilmer),5 the
Supreme Court held that, unless a party could show that Congress had
intended to preclude waiver of a judicial forum for a statutory claim,
pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate those statutory claims were
enforceable under the FAA. In 2001, in the case of Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Circuit City),36 the Supreme Court narrowly
interpreted the "contracts of employment" exception in section 1 of
the FAA to exempt only contracts by seamen, railroad men, and other
employees similarly employed "in interstate commerce." As a result
of Gilmer and Circuit City, the general rule is that the pre-dispute
arbitration agreements of today's nonunion grievance and arbitration
procedures are enforceable.
1. The Rise of Employer-Sponsored Grievance and Arbitration
Procedures Under Individual Contract
Employer-sponsored grievance and arbitration procedures did
not take off until the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer. One
estimate suggests that at the time of the Gilmer decision less than 2%
of the nonunion workforce had access to a grievance procedure that
resulted in arbitration.37 Since that time, nonunion employers have
taken much greater interest in participatory systems for resolving
34. Katherine Van Wetzel Stone, Employment Arbitration Under the Federal Arbitration
Act, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKERS RIGHTS 27, 37 (Adrienne E.
Eaton & Jeffery H. Keefe eds., 1999).
35. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
36. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
37. Peter Feuille & Denise R. Chachere, Looking Fair or Being Fair: Remedial Voice
Procedure in Nonunion Workplaces, 21 J. MGMT. 27 (1995).
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workplace disputes including employee committees, mediation,
ombudsmen, grievance procedures, and even grievance procedures
that result in neutral arbitration. Although no comprehensive survey
of the growth in the use of these systems exist, reliable estimates
suggest that the percent of nonunion workplaces that employ
grievance procedures that result in arbitration grew to about 10% in
1995, 16% in 1998,38 and currently is approximately 19%.' 9 Moreover,
it has been estimated that over 50% of the nonunion workforce
currently has access to some form of dispute resolution procedure.?
There are several reasons for employers' increased interest in
individual grievance procedures in the last twenty years. The
consensus seems to be that the primary reason for their assent has
been employer concern about the costs of litigation. 1 In particular
Stone4" has identified the increased number and costliness of
discrimination suits in the 1990s as the driving factor, while Wheeler,
Klass, and Mahoney43 would also cite employer concern over potential
liability for wrongful discharge or breach of contract suits under
exceptions to the employment at will doctrine. Abraham and Voos
found that, in the securities industry, the decision by a firm to adopt a
grievance and arbitration system in the setting of individual
employment contracts increased profits on average by 3%. 44 The
desire of employers to avoid employee organization by aping union
communication and procedures also plays a role. In a national survey
of 36 employers with nonunion grievance and arbitration procedures,
Bickner, Ver Ploeg, and Feigenbaum4 found that 75% had adopted
the procedures due to concerns over litigation costs, while only 10%
cited union avoidance as a motivating factor. Colvin 46 examined the
results of a survey of 3002 firms and found that both institutional
factors, such as litigation costs and the expanded deferral of courts to
38. Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Relationship Between Employment Arbitration and
Workplace Dispute Procedures, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 643 (2001).
39. Galle & Koen, supra note 9.
40. David Lewin, Grievance Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces: Empirical Analysis of
Usage, Dynamics, and Outcomes, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 823 (1990); HOYT N. WHEELER, BRIAN
S. KLAAS & DOUGLAS M. MAHONY, WORKPLACE JUSTICE WITHOUT UNIONS 16-17 (2004).
41. WHEELER, KLAAS & MAHONY, supra note 40, at 17-20.
42. Van Wetzel Stone, supra note 34.
43. WHEELER, KLAAS & MAHONY, supra note 40, at 19.
44. Steven E. Abraham & Paula B. Voos, Empirical Data on Employer Gains from
Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Disputes, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 341 (2000).
45. Mei L. Bickner, Christine Ver Ploeg & Charles Feigenbaum, Developments in
Employment Arbitration, 52 DISP. RES. J. 8, 78-83 (1997).
46. Colvin, supra note 38; Alexander J.S. Colvin, Institutional Pressures, Human Resource
Strategies, and the Rise of Nonunion Dispute Resolution Procedures, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 375 (2003).
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nonunion arbitration, as well as human resource strategies, such as
union avoidance, commonly contribute to employer decisions to adopt
nonunion grievance and arbitration procedures.
2. Concerns About Employer-Sponsored Grievance and
Arbitration Procedures
The growth of individual grievance procedures resulting in
binding arbitration has been a matter of some controversy in the legal
literature. Critics have set forth a number of important criticisms
particularly as it relates to arbitration of issues of individual rights
under general law.47 First, arbitration often limits or eliminates
important procedural protections. Arbitrators may not be expert in
the area of law in question and generally do not follow the federal
rules of evidence or procedure. Discovery rights may be cursory or
non-existent, leaving the employee with no effective way to build his
case. Second, arbitration procedures may not afford employees all of
the remedies they would have had at law. Arbitrators cannot grant
injunctions and may not be able to hear class actions or grant
attorneys' fees or costs. Third, arbitration may limit or interfere with
our ability to develop a precedential body of law. Arbitrators may not
issue a written opinion or give reasons for their decisions. For this
reason, the EEOC, Department of Labor, and the NLRB have all, at
various times, taken positions against pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate individual legal controversies. Fourth, employees are often
asked to share in the costs of employing an arbitrator, and it is feared
that this will unjustly discourage employee grievances. In union
arbitration the union pays the employee's share while in
administrative and court proceedings the taxpayer foots the bill.
More generally, it is argued that, because of the asymmetry of the
employment relationship, employers may have unfair advantages in
individual arbitrations that they don't enjoy in union arbitrations. As
Malin has pointed out, the reality of the situation is that individual
agreements to arbitrate don't come from bargained for exchange, but
instead are unilaterally imposed by the employer.48 It is feared that
the employer will use her unilateral power to impose arbitration
procedures that are unfair and favorable to her or to select a biased
arbitrator49 and that fear has borne fruit in more than a few cases."
47. WHEELER, KLAAS & MAHONY, supra note 40, at 37-44.
48. Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice-But By How Much? Questions that Gilmer Did
Not Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. DiSP. RES. 589 (2001).
49. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 34.
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The unilateral nature of the agreement also raises serious questions
about the effectiveness of the employee's waiver of the right to a jury
trial, which, at least under Title VII, must be "knowingly, voluntary
and intelligent." Even in the absence of express bias, it is worried that
arbitrators may cater to employer interests in order to secure future
business. As well intentioned as they might be, arbitrators will know
that their being selected for future work will more likely depend on
the employers satisfaction in the case than on the satisfaction of an
employee they will likely never see again. Bingham has also argued
that the employer has the advantage of experience and the incentive
of precedent as a "repeat player" in individual arbitration." Under
union arbitration, both sides to the dispute are repeat players with
experience and interest in precedent. It has long been known in the
legal literature that, when one side to a controversy is a repeat player
and the other side is a "one-shot player," the law evolves to inefficient
rules that favor the repeat player.52
Supporters of nonunion arbitration counter with arguments of
their own. 3 Proponents contend that nonunion arbitration enjoys
many of the same advantages as union arbitration. It is faster, less
50. See, e.g., Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) in which the
Fourth Circuit found that the employer sponsored arbitration plan was a "sham system" "utterly
lacking in the rudiments of even-handedness." Id. at 940.
51. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL'Y J. 187 (1997) [hereinafter Bingham, Employment Arbitration]. Bingham has also
pointed out that employers will have advantages in nonunion grievance arbitration procedures
because of the "repeat player" effect. Id.; Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive
Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29
MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998) [hereinafter Bingham, On Recent Players]. In arbitration or
litigation, repeat players have advantages not only because they have experience with the
process, but also because they take into account the value of precedent in deciding whether or
not to adjudicate the matter and how much to spend to win the case. In arbitration between an
employer and a union, both sides have experience and can reasonably expect to be dealing with
the same or similar controversies in the future. Thus, in union arbitration, there are repeat
players on both sides. However, in arbitration between an employer and an individual
employee, the individual employee probably has no experience and would reasonably believe
that it is unlikely he or she will arbitrate with the employer again in the future. Thus, in
nonunion arbitration, only the employer enjoys the repeat player advantages. In a sample of 270
arbitration cases under AAA arbitration rules that included both repeat player employers and
one-shot employers, Bingham found that employees did significantly worse against the repeat
player employers winning only 16% of the time and collecting only 11% of what they demanded,
as opposed to winning in excess of 63% of the time and collecting 48% of what they demanded
against one-shot employers. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player
Effect, 1 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 187 (1997).
52. Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & SoC'Y REV. 95 (1974); Paul Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 51-63 (1977).
53. WHEELER, KLAAS & MAHONY, supra note 40, at 33-37.
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divisive and cheaper than litigation.54 Why shouldn't nonunion
employees have the advantages of arbitration enjoyed by union
employees? The ease of arbitration makes grievance adjustment
more accessible to employees. As a result, workers will be able to
address more of their grievances than if they were left merely to
litigate their disputes.5 Greater access will leave less conflicts to
fester engendering a greater feeling of fairness and justice in the
workplace. Supporters contend that nonunion arbitration can be fair
if it complies with certain minimal procedural safeguards. Because
nonunion grievance agreements generally are contracts of adhesion
(that is they are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis) they can be
struck down as "unconscionable" if the contract is the result of
coercive bargaining between two parties of unequal bargaining power
and the contract unfairly advantages the stronger party.56 Indeed, in
Cole v. Burns International Security Services (Cole)57 the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit interpreted Gilmer to require five
safeguards for any pre-dispute employment arbitration clause to be
enforceable: a neutral arbitrator, opportunity for discovery, a written
award, the availability of all remedies available at law, and no
arbitrators' fee for the employee. Other courts and professional
organizations have followed suit.58  The loss of a jury trial is not
considered too serious because in practice few employees ever get to
54. RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT 9 (1997).
55. Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1997).
56. LAURA J. COOPER, DENNIS R. NOLAN & RICHARD A. BALES, ADR IN THE
WORKPLACE 560 (2000).
57. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir 1997).
58. Several courts have followed this decision. See, e.g., Hooters of America, Inc. v.
Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999); Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.,
24 Cal. 4th 86 (C.A. S. Ct. 2000); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Civ. 2003).
Moreover, in 1995, the National Academy of Arbitrators, American Arbitration Association,
American Civil Liberties Union, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, National
Employment Lawyers Association, and Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution all agreed
to a "Due Process Protocol" that set minimum standards for arbitration proceedings. The Due
Process Protocol requires: that the parties jointly pick a neutral arbitrator versed in the relevant
law, discovery provisions allowing a reasonable number of depositions, a right for the employee
to be represented, a written decision consistent with the law, a remedy consistent with the law,
and limited judicial review. The American Arbitration Association and JAMS/Endispute, two
of the primary associations responsible for administering nonunion arbitration proceedings, have
determined that they will handle such arbitrations only if the procedure complies with the
Protocol. Employers can still avoid these minimal procedural safe guards in their arbitration
process if they are located in a circuit that doesn't follow Cole and they use an arbitrator who is
not bound by the Due Process Protocol, but the trend in the law seems to be that minimal due
process requirements must be met for an arbitration agreement to be enforceable. See
WHEELER, KLAAS & MAHONEY, supra note 40, at 23-28.
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bring their claims before a jury. 9 Some also contest whether
employers really enjoy advantages in nonunion arbitration.6" They
point out that employers generally do better in litigation than in
nonunion arbitration. Finally, supporters of nonunion arbitration
pose a public policy argument stating that nonunion arbitration will
ease the caseload of our over-worked courts. 6
3. Empirical Tests of the Efficacy and Fairness of Employer
Sponsored Grievance and Arbitration Procedures Relative to Labor
Arbitration or Litigation
To empirically assess the efficacy and fairness of individual
grievance arbitration relative to union arbitration or individual
litigation is more difficult than one might initially suppose. With a few
exceptions, empirical analyses have found that individual employees
win individual grievances in greater proportion than they lose them
(52-62%) and in about the same proportion as they win under union
arbitration or state court adjudication and in greater proportion than
they win in federal court.62  Unfortunately it is hard to infer much
59. Estreicher, supra note 55.
60. Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory
Arbitration in Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399 (2000).
61. BALES, supra note 54, at 9.
62. There is a fair amount of empirical work assessing employee win rates in nonunion
arbitration, union arbitration and state and federal court. One of the first systematic studies of
nonunion employment arbitration done by Howard found that employees won 68% of the
examined cases. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination, 50 DiS.
RESOL. J. 40 (1995). Bingham examined 20 nonunion AAA arbitration cases from the years
1993-1994 and found that employees enjoyed a 63% win rate. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment
Arbitration, supra note 51. In a later study of including earlier AAA cases, Bingham found that
employees in nonunion arbitration experienced a 52% win rate, but that employees won 69% of
the cases involving individual employment contracts and only 21%of the cases involving
employment manuals. This same study by Bingham is where she found that employers enjoyed
a repeat player effect in nonunion employment arbitration. A widely cited study of nonunion
AAA cases from the years 1993-1995 by Maltby found that the employees won 63% of the time.
Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REv. 29 (1998). The most pessimistic results on nonunion arbitration were obtained by
Leroy and Feuille. Based on a sample of individual employment arbitration cases over the
period 1990-2001, they found that the employee won only 21% of the cases, achieved a split
award in 18% and out right lost in 62% of the cases. Michael H. Leroy & Peter Feuille, Private
Justice in the Shadow of Public Courts: The Autonomy of Workplace Arbitration Systems, 17
OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 19 (2001).
The results of union arbitration procedures have been a subject of study for quite some
time. Researchers have examined the impact of grievant characteristics (work history, job
category, gender, resources, represented by counsel), employer characteristics (antiunion
animus, resources, represented by counsel), arbitrator characteristics (age, gender, experience)
and grievance characteristics (type of claim, existence of statutory criteria) on the outcome of
arbitrations. Robert J. Thornton & Perry A. Zerkel, The Consistency and Predictability of
Grievance Arbitration Awards, 43 INDUS & LAB. REL. REV. 294 (1990); Harsh K. Luthar &
Joseph Bonnici, The Arbitration of Discrimination Complaints: A New Look at the Issues, 11
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about the equity of an adjudicative process just by looking at won/loss
rates. The employee win rate using a given procedure or forum will
accurately reflect the fraction of employee winners among all possible
claimants only if the arbitrated or tried cases are a random sample of
all claimants. However, an employee's decision to take a claim to
arbitration or trial, or even to file a grievance or suit, undoubtedly
depends on the employee's assessment of the fairness of that
procedure and his or her chances of winning. If the employee knows a
process is unfair, he or she will grieve and arbitrate or file and try only
the disputes where the employee's case is so strong that he or she has
a reasonable chance of prevailing even under the biased procedure.
Indeed, Priest and Klein have demonstrated that, given
symmetrical stakes and information between the parties, the plaintiff
win rate in any process, no matter how unfair, will tend toward 50%.63
However, if one side has higher stakes, perhaps because that side is a
repeat player and takes account of the value of precedent, the Priest-
Klein model predicts that the party with greater stakes will win less of
EMP. RESP. & RTS. J. 159 (1998); Lisa B. Bingham & Denise R. Chachere, Dispute Resolution in
Employment: The Need for Research, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER
RIGHTS IN THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 111 (Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe eds.,
1999). Because union employees enjoy written contracts with greater contractual protections,
union arbitrations are much more likely to involve contractual claims, as opposed to statutory
claims, than nonunion arbitrations. Accordingly union arbitrations are likely to involve different
questions of law and fact than nonunion arbitrations. Nevertheless, the empirical literature
seems to suggest that employees win slightly over half of union arbitrations. In a 1987 study of
1042 union discharge arbitration cases, Block and Stieber found that the employee was
reinstated in 57% of the examined cases. Richard N. Block & Jack Stieber, The Impact of
Attornies and Arbitrators on Arbitration Awards, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 543 (1987).
Employees' success rate in litigation apparently depends on whether the cause of action
is tried in state or federal court. Two studies of wrongful discharge cases in California
determined that the employees were winning between 68% and 70% of the cases. JAMES N.
DERTOUZOS, ELAINE HOWARD & PATRICIA EBENER, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION (1988); David J. Jung & Richard Harkness, The
Facts of Wrongful Discharge, 4 LAB. LAW. 257 (1988). More recently, Estreicher has found in a
sample of state civil court filings from 1991-1992, employees won 64% of the termination cases.
Estreicher, supra note 55. With respect to federal court cases, Howard reported that employees
won only 28% of the cases that went to trial, although they won 38% of the cases tried by a jury.
William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination, 50 DISP. RESOL. J. 40
(1995). Maltby found that employees won only 15% of the cases in his 1994 federal court
sample. Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29 (1998). In a nation-wide sample of employment discrimination cases,
Litras found that employee won 24% of trial verdicts in 1990 and 36% in 1998. Marika F.X.
Litras, Bureau of Justice Statistics Report on Civil Rights Complaints Filed in U.S. District Courts,
DAILY LABOR REPORT, Jan. 10, 2000, at E-5-E-7. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) seems to have more success with the discrimination case they prosecute.
A study of 1,963 suits filed by the EEOC between 1997 and 2001 found that the agency won 60%
of its trials and obtained successful settlements or verdicts in 91% of its cases. EEOC. A Study
of the Litigation Program Fiscal Years 1997-2001, http://www.eeoc.gov/litigaion/study/study.htm
(2002).
63. George Priest & B. Klein, The Selection of Dispute for Litigation, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 1
(1984).
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the disputes because it will pay for that party to litigate worse cases.
64
Bebchuk has also shown that, if the parties have asymmetric
information about their chances of winning, the win rate will be higher
for the better informed party.65 Since in individual arbitration, the
employer is both a repeat player, and generally has superior
information, these two effects will work against each other and it is an
empirical question which effect will dominate. Regardless of the
outcome of this empirical question, there is strong evidence in the
legal literature that the cases that go to trial are not a random sample
of all possible disputes," and it seems doubtful that under either
individual or union grievance arbitration that the cases that go to
arbitration are a random sample of all possible grievances.
Accordingly, in comparing the two procedures we cannot just
compare won/loss rates.
It does seem that employee claims are subject to significantly
different attrition and settlement rates prior to adjudication when
comparing arbitration and litigation. Howard has estimated that only
about 5% of employee job claims that are brought to lawyers are
accepted by those lawyers.67 There is no available estimate as to how
many meritorious employee claims simply don't yield enough
damages to merit the costs of litigation. Surveys show that from 79-
84% of court cases that are brought are settled before final
adjudication.68 Settlements in arbitration cases are less common and
have been estimated at between 31-44%.69 There is no good data on
these settlements, so no authoritative statement can be made about
the percent of settlements that are favorable to employees in either
individual or union arbitration.
It also seems clear that the different methods of adjudication of
workplace disputes have different costs and different rewards. As
previously discussed, the different costs to the employee of access to
individual and union grievance arbitration depending on whether the
employee is required to share in the costs of the arbitrator in the
nonunion proceeding is a matter of some concern as to the equity of
the process relative to union arbitration or litigation. Arbitrators
charge about $2,000 a day for their services while judges' salaries are
64. Id.
65. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J.
ECON. 404 (1984).
66. Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship Between Trial and
Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. POL. ECON. 229 (1995).
67. Howard, supra note 62.
68. Id.
69. WHEELER, KLAAS & MAHONY, supra note 40, at 51.
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paid by the taxpayers. Filing fees can also be higher for arbitrators at
about $500 plus $150 per day of hearing for the AAA. Court filing
fees are generally between $100 to $200. However, with respect to
attorney's fees, either nonunion or union arbitration appear to enjoy
an advantage over litigation. In 1995, Howard estimated that the
average cost of defending an arbitration was $20,000, while the
average cost of defending an employment claim in court was $96,000.70
Claimants' costs for representation are probably proportional, but
less, and of course claimants' enjoy the advantage of contingent fees.
The employee in a union grievance procedure also enjoys the
advantage that the union generally pays for the employee's
representation. Arbitration also seems to enjoy an advantage in the
time necessary for determination of a case, taking on average half the
time7" of litigation's average 12-18 months. However, litigation
seems to enjoy a distinct advantage with respect to the amounts that
aggrieved employees recover upon final adjudication. The median
nonunion arbitration award during the 1990s has been estimated at
between $34,733 and $52,73771 while the median award for successful
employment discrimination suits during the same time has been
estimated at between $611,756 and $2,134,751. A study of wrongful
discharge cases in California for the years 1978-1987 found that
employees won a median award of $124,150. 71
Short of sampling all possible disputes as a comprehensive
method of comparing the different methods of adjudication, there are
a few ways scholars could attempt to deal with the problem of
different filing and settlement rates due to differences in perceptions
of fairness. One is to directly assess parties' perceptions of whether an
adjudicative process is fair. Although this process would be subject to
criticisms of subjectivity and self-selection bias, perceptions of fairness
are undoubtedly important to the integrity of any adjudication
procedure.76  In perhaps the best study to date utilizing this
methodology Wheeler, Klaas, and Mahoney found that arbitrators
perceive that individual arbitration serves employer interests better
than employee interests with respect to all of the examined types of
70. Howard, supra note 62.
71. Maltby, supra note 62.
72. WHEELER, KLAAS & MAHONY, supra note 40, at 60; Litras, supra note 62; see contra
Green, supra note 60 (arguing that arbitration saves employers neither money nor time).
73. Estreicher, supra note 55.
74. WHEELER, KLAAS & MAHONY, supra note 40, at 57.
75. Jung & Harkness, supra note 62.
76. Donna Blancero, Non-Union Grievance Systems: System Characteristics and Fairness
Perceptions, 1995 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT PROCEEDINGS 84-88 (1995).
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cases." Another method that could be used to address the problem
would be to try to control for other variables and examine just the
decisionmaking processes of arbitrators and judges by posing
hypothetical cases to them and comparing the results. Bingham and
Mesch have conducted just such a study of 743 subjects including
traditional labor arbitrators, arbitrators for individual employment
arbitration agreements, and law students. Bingham and Mesch found
that "employment arbitrators" for individual agreements to arbitrate
were less likely to find for reinstatement than either traditional labor
arbitrators or law students, although when the analysis controlled for
variables such as the profession of the arbitrator, no significant
difference was observed.78 More recently, Wheeler, Klaas, and
Mahoney conducted a survey of arbitrators and found that in
comparison with arbitrators under collective bargaining agreements,
arbitrators under individual arbitration were agreements more likely
to place the burden of proof on the employee, less likely to overturn
discharges pursuant to clearly unreasonable rules, and less likely to
overturn discharges where the employer acted in mistaken good
faith.7 9
III. LEGAL LIMITS ON EMPLOYER POWER UNDER THE REGIME OF
INDIVIDUAL CONTRACT: EXCEPTIONS TO THE EMPLOYMENT AT
WILL DOCTRINE
The employment at will rule has been a central tenet of the
regime of individual contract in the United States for over 100 years.
Under this rule, unless otherwise bargained for, an employee can be
discharged "for good cause, no cause, or even for cause morally
wrong."8 This rule was rigidly applied in all American jurisdictions
for well over fifty years, but beginning in 1959 with Petermann v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Petermann)"' the courts and
legislatures of the various jurisdictions began to develop exceptions to
the employment at will rule to address the worst employer abuses of
the doctrine. In Petermann, a California District Court of Appeals
held that it would be against public policy to discharge an employee
77. WHEELER, KLAAS & MAHONY, supra note 40, at 65.
78. Lisa B. Bingham & Debra J. Mesch, Decision Making in Employment and Labor
Arbitration, 39 INDUS. REL. 671 (2000).
79. WHEELER, KLAAS & MAHONY, supra note 40, at 68.
80. Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) overruled on other grounds.
81. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,344 P. 2d 25 (1959).
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who refused to commit perjury for his employer's benefit.8" As a
result, the court gave the employee a tort cause of action against his
employer to uphold the public's interest in truthful sworn testimony.
Over the next forty years, courts in other jurisdictions developed
exceptions to the at will rule. Between 1979 and 1988, the number of
states adopting the public policy exception exploded, with one
commentator estimating that nearly five states adopted the exception
each year between 1984-1986.83 Over this same period, a number of
American courts relaxed their rigid application of the at will rule and
adopted "exceptions" in implied contract.' Some jurisdictions also
found in individual employment contracts an "implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing" that limited employer discretion even
under the at will rule. Although the phenomenon has been less
discussed by legal commentators over the last fifty years, many states
have also adopted specific statutory limitations on the application of
the at will doctrine, for example prohibiting discharge for performing
public duties or engaging in lawful off-duty activities. In 1982 alone, a
majority of states passed laws regulating the terms and conditions of
employment.85 Based on these trends, a host of commentators
predicted the at will rule would eventually die.86
Despite the growth of the exceptions to employment at will, it is
clear today that the at will rule is alive and well in America, albeit in a
somewhat attenuated form. As stated above, 52% of all individual
employment contracts specifically contract for at will status. Another
33% of individual contracts are silent as to the discharge status, and
thus at will under the American rule. Given that about 85% of
nonunion employees are employed at will," the legal parameters of
the at will rule and its exceptions are essential elements of the regime
of workplace governance under individual contract. To create a
contract for at will employment necessarily requires that employers
are bound by all the exceptions to the at will rule now adopted, and
later acquired, within each particular jurisdiction. As the courts and
legislatures carve exceptions to the at will rule in order to ease the
82. Robert Bird, Rethinking Wrongful Discharge: A Continuum Approach, 73 U. CIN. L.
REV. 520 (2004-2005).
83. Id. at 521.
84. Bird cites the number of states recognizing an implied contract exception to the at will
rule rising from 10 to "nearly 40" in that time period. Id. at 521-22 nn.19-21.
85. Joseph DeGuiseppe, Jr., Recognition of Public Policy Exceptions to the At will Rule: A
Legislative Function, 11 FORD. URB. L. REV. 721 (1982-1983).
86. See, e.g., Frank J. Cavico, Employment at Will and Public Policy, 25 AKRON L. REV. 497
(1992).
87. Verkerke, supra note 13.
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harshness of its application, the resulting erosion of the at will rule
fundamentally alters the individual employment relationship.
Although employment at will is still the American default rule
with respect to the standard for discharge from employment, there is
no uniform application of the employment at will principles across all
jurisdictions. In essence, there are 51 different at will rules in effect in
the United States,' one for each state and the District of Columbia.
Despite this variation among jurisdictions, there are key similarities
that allow for empirical comparison. Many jurisdictions recognize
similar exceptions to the at will rule, including the prohibition for
termination in violation of public policy, implied contract terms, and
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Even where an
exception has been expressly rejected by the courts of a jurisdiction,
later enacted state statutes have often protected employees from
precisely the same discharge. The legislature has also been active in
circumstances of pressing public concern, for example drafting
protections for employees who are fired for performing public services
such as jury duty or disaster relief or for reporting the illegal acts of
their employers. In this section we present an empirical summary of
the judicial and legislative exceptions to the employment at will rule
across the 51 American jurisdictions. A comparison of our work with
earlier summaries on this subject suggests that, although the courts
and legislatures have developed an impressive array of exceptions to
the employment at will doctrine, in recent years the development of
such exceptions has slowed and the state law exceptions to the at will
rule have remained largely consistent over the last decade.
A. Public Policy Exceptions
By either common law doctrine or legislation, all American
jurisdictions recognize some public policy exceptions to the
employment at will doctrine. Ten years ago, 43 states courts had
recognized a public policy exception.89 Today, courts in 44 of the 51
jurisdictions have adopted a judicially recognized public policy
exception. Courts in six of the seven jurisdictions that have declined
to accept a public policy exception have done so on the grounds that
public policy should be left to the legislature.' State legislation in five
88. Fifty states and the District of Columbia.
89. Gabriel Rosenthal, Crafting a New Means of Analysis of Wrongful Discharge Claims
based on Promises in Employee Handbooks, 71 WASH L. REV. 1157, 1162 n. 34 (1996).
90. In Georgia, Borden v. Johnson, 395 S. E.2d 628 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990), in Rhode Island,
Pacheoco v. Raytheon Company, 623 A.2d 464 (R.I. 1993); in New York, Horn v. New York
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of the seven, Florida, Louisiana, Maine, New York, and Rhode Island,
protect virtually all the activities normally contained within a
judicially-created public policy exception," while legislation in
Alabama and Georgia protects employees for performing various
public duties.92
Under this exception, an employer does not have the power to
terminate an employee where the reason behind the termination
contravenes "public policy." Different jurisdictions may define
"public policy" more or less broadly, but generally the courts are
looking for a clear statement by the legislature or the courts that the
public has an interest in the employee either abstaining from a
particular act or performing a duty, that will be undermined if we
allow employers to discipline employees for acting consistently with
that public interest. There seems a straightforward economic
rationale for this exception since, if the problem were left merely to
individual contract, the employee would have inadequate incentive to
uphold the public interest in negotiating the conditions for discharge.
The courts have used this public policy rationale to give employees
causes of action against some of the most abusive employer behavior
under the employment at will rule including discharges for: failing to
perform an illegal act on behalf of an employer,93 reporting an
employer's illegal act,94 serving on a jury,95 and filing a worker's
Times, 790 N.E.2d 753 (N.Y. 2003); in Louisiana, Guillory v. St. Landry Parish Police Jury, 802
F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1986) (refusing to adopt a public policy exception). Additionally Maine and
Florida courts do not allow public policy exception claims, rather state statutes are the sole
source of remedy for employees. Bard v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 590 A.2d 152 (Maine 1991),
Smith v. Piezo Technology and Professional Administrators, 427 So.2d 182, 184 (Flor. 1983).
Statutory relief in these states are relatively broad, see note 91 infra. In the seventh state,
Alabama, the judicial debate over the public policy exception continues. Although courts have
never formally adopted the exception, Chief Justice Hornsby advocated its adoption in Salter v.
Alfa Ins. Co., 561 So.2d 1050 (Ala. 1990), Chief Justice Horsby concuring.
91. Rhode Island, New York, Maine, Florida and Louisiana protect employees from
discharge for refusing to violate the law and whistleblowing. R.I. GEN. LAWS 28-50-3(3), LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. 23:967, FLA. STAT. ch. 448.101 to 448.105, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 26 section
831 to 840 N. Y. LAB. LAW 740 and 741 and a variety of other protected activities. See Timothy
A. Haley, State Law Exceptions to the Employment at Will Doctrine, in LEGAL RIGHTS IN THE
WORKPLACE: STATUTORY SUPPLEMENT AND MATERIALS (Clyde W. Summers, Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt & Alan Hyde, forthcoming 2007).
92. Alabama protects employees who serve on a jury, ALA. CODE § 12-16-8. Georgia
protects employees who are required to serve as a witness, GA. CODE ANN. 15-1-4 and 34-1-3,
required to serve on a jury GA. CODE ANN 15-1-4; 34-1-3; and grants a two hour leave for all
employees in order to vote GA. CODE ANN. 21-2-404.
93. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, (Col. 1992) "An employee ...
should not be put to the choice of either obeying an employer's order to violate the law or losing
his or her job." Id. at 109.
94. See, e.g., Vermillion v. AAA Pro Moving & Storage, 146 Ariz. 215 (1985).
95. See, e.g., Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977).
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compensation claim.96 As previously mentioned, in jurisdictions
where the courts have completely abstained from recognizing this
exception, the state legislatures have intervened with at least some
protections.
While the public policy exception works well to curtail the most
disturbing of employer actions, the public policy exception itself lacks
readily discernable boundaries to guide judicial action. As Professor
Weiler has noted, after the initial success of judicial determination of
overt violations of standards of acceptability, the next wave of cases
courts consider are much less obvious.97 In the common law regime,
the facts and arguments specific to one particular controversy
necessarily affect the outcome of future disputes. The fuzzy line that
determines what is or is not "public policy" thus dominates both state
court decisions as well as legislative action. For our purposes, we
consider three aspects typically falling within the bounds of a public
policy exception. First, we consider the case of an at will employee
discharged for refusing to perform an illegal act. Second, we consider
the case of whistleblowers. Last, we consider the case of an employee
discharged due to lawful performance of a public duty.
1. Termination for Refusing to Perform an Illegal Act
Though courts in each jurisdiction have nearly unanimously
adopted a public policy exception, each state has different limits to the
breadth of activities that qualify for protection. To the extent there is
consensus, the majority of state courts have agreed that an employer
cannot discharge an employee who refuses to perform an act that is
illegal. In all, 38 state courts have explicitly allowed a cause of action
where an employee refused to perform an illegal act.98 Another 8
states (Arizona, North Dakota, New York, New Jersey, Maine,
Florida, Louisiana, and Rhode Island) have specific legislation that
forbids this type of termination.99 Four states have adopted a public
96. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
97. PAUL WEILER, GOVERNANCE IN THE WORKPLACE 80 (1990).
98. Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia. Haley, supra
note 91.
99. Arizona: ARIz. REV. STAT. § 23-1501; North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE §34-01-20; New
York: N.Y. LAB. LAW 740 and 741; New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN 34:19-1 to 34:19-8; Maine: ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 26 §§ 831-840; Florida: FLA. STAT. CH. 448.101-448.105 ; Louisiana: LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. 23:967; Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS 28-50-3(3).
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policy exception but have not yet expressly expanded the doctrine to
cover situations where an employee is discharged for refusing to
perform an illegal act."° Language in these four states and the judicial
history of these four states seems to indicate that they would not allow
an employer to discharge an employee under these circumstances.
Only one state, Georgia, has declined to adopt a judicial public policy
exception and also not passed general legislative protection for
employees who refuse to break the law, but the Georgia legislature
has passed a law that protects all public employees from such
discharge."'
However, once it is established that an employee cannot be
discharged for failing to violate the law, the courts must then answer
the question: Which laws? On this question the jurisdictions vary
widely and there is substantial room for litigation. It may seem
obvious that employers should not be able to terminate an employee
for refusing to commit a crime, for example perjury. °2 It is less
obvious whether the courts should interfere with the at will
presumption where the employer seeks to induce a violation of a civil
statute or administrative rule. Most states have not been squarely
addressed by all courts, but among the courts who have addressed the
issue, the outcomes vary widely. In Ohio, for example, the courts
have debated this issue and ultimately decided to extend public policy
exception to all sources of law.03 In Minnesota, a filling station
employee who was terminated for refusing to pump leaded gas into an
unleaded tank was wrongfully discharged, as the act in question
violated the Federal Clean Air Act.' °4 In Indiana, a truck driver who
refused to drive until his vehicle met the safety specification
prescribed by the Indiana Department of Transportation was
100. Though these states have not squarely addressed the issue, it seems likely given other
opinions that they would grant a cause of action in such instances. Alabama: See Salter v. Alfa
Ins. Co., 561 So.2d 1050, Chief Justice Horsby, concurring, advocating such a public policy
exception, Alaska: See ARCO Alaska Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153, (1988), Kansas: Fowler
v. Criticare Home Health Services, 10 P.3d 8 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) finding the activity requested
by the employer to be legal, without expressly determining whether the cause of action existed,
Wyoming: Hatfield v. Rachelle Coal Co., 813 P.2d 1308 (Wyo. 1991) citing the example of
refusal to break the law as a hypothetical event, but the exact incident event has not been
directly addressed.
101. GA. CODE ANN. 45-1-4(d)(3). For court refusal to adopt public policy exception, see
Borden v. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d 628 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
102. See Petermann v. IBT, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) employee fired for refusing to commit perjury
is contrary to public policy; public policy exception adopted in Idaho in Jackson v. Minidoka
Irrigation Dist., 563, P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977).
103. The Ohio Supreme Court extended the public policy to cover civil laws in Collins v.
Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995).
104. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987).
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wrongfully discharged, because the court found the public policy
exception extends to cover all sources of law for which the employee
himself may be held personally liable. °5 In perhaps the most liberal
cases, Delaware has extended this exception to cover employees who
are terminated for refusing to violate a professional code of ethics.16
2. Whistleblower Protection
The legal protections for employees who report employer
violations of law have increased enormously in the last twenty-five
years. Designed to encourage employees to report their employer's
legal and administrative transgressions, in large part in response to the
Savings and Loan scandal of the mid-1980s and more recently the
Enron and World Coin debacles, the expansion of whistleblower
protection is perhaps the most significant change to the at will
relationship since 1980. In 1980, whistleblower protection was a
relatively new idea. Michigan and Connecticut enacted such
legislation in the early 1980s, while the New York legislature first
considered such employee protection in 1983."°7 Today, 34 states
provide some whistleblower protection to all at will employees. °8 Ten
of these states limit the types of employer violations that an employee
can report without discharge.0 9 All of the 17 jurisdictions that do not
extend whistleblower protection to all employees currently have
105. Remington Freight Lines Inc. v. Larkey, 644 N.E.2d 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
106. Shearin v. The E. R. Hutton Group, 652 A.2d 578.
107. DeGuiseppe, supra note 85, at 738-740, n.89.
108. These states include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming. Haley, supra note 91.
109. Alabama limits protection to those who report child labor law violations. ALA. CODE §
25-8-57; Delaware statute limits protections to reports of fraud and false reporting DEL. CODE
ANN. TIT. 6 Sections 1201-1209. The third circuit has found that the Delaware public policy
exception covers all whistle-blowing claims. Paolella v. Browning Ferris, 14 I.E.R. Cases 705 (3d
Cir. 1998); Massachusetts limits whistle-blower protection to those who report fraud and false
reporting: MASS. GEN. LAWS. CH. 12 §§ 5A and 5J; New Mexico limits protection to Safety and
Health violations, N.M. STAT. ANN. 50-9-25 and reporting false medicaid claims: N. M. STAT.
ANN. 27-14-12; North Carolina limits protection only for reporting claims of worker's
compensation, wages and hours, workplace safety, mine safety, genetic discrimination, sickle cell
or heomoglobin C trait discrimination, National guard re-employment, and domestic violence
victims rights: N.C. GEN. STAT §§ 95-28.1, 95-28.1A, 95-240 through 95-245; South Carolina
limits protections to those who report work-related health and safety violations: S.C. CODE ANN
41-15-510; 41-15-520; and 71 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 336; Texas provides limited protection for
Occupational Health and Safety violations only: TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. 411.082 and 411.083 and
TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. 505.603; Utah limits protection to claims for health and safety
complaints: UTAH CODE ANN. 34A-6-203; Virginia only allows claims to safety complaints: VA.
CODE ANN. 8.01-216.1 to 801-216.9; and Wyoming only allows claims to workplace safety and
health complaints only, WYO. STAT. ANN. 27-11-109(e).
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legislation that protects at least one class of workers. In these 17
jurisdictions, the classes of workers that are most likely to be
protected are government workers and healthcare providers.
Additionally, given the rapid growth of acceptance of this exception, it
seems likely that a court not bound by precedent or statute may
choose to adopt whistleblower protections for all at will employees,
given the opportunity.'
10
3. Performing a Public Duty
In some circumstances, an employee may be forced to choose
between obligations imposed by an employer and obligations imposed
by American society. Where community obligations rise to the level
of public duties, an employee's participation in such activity may be
protected by law. That is, an employer cannot lawfully discharge an
employee for the employee's fulfillment of his or her public duties.
Perhaps the most common scenario for this quandary in the case law
involves an employee who is terminated for serving on a jury."' In
such cases, the employee is caught between the obligation to her
employer to show up and perform work and her obligation to her
community to serve as a peer in jury cases. Sometimes, courts have
awarded damages for breach of contract or tort on the basis of the
public policy exception to employees who are discharged or
disciplined for fulfilling their obligation of jury duty." ' Perhaps more
remarkably, all of the state legislatures have spoken definitively on
the subject and it is a violation of public policy for an employer to
discharge an employee for serving on a jury in every jurisdiction. 3
Although jury duty is the most commonly accepted public duty
for the public policy exception, most states accept others. The state
legislatures have protected many other activities from employer
retaliation, and each state has its own unique set of activities that are
protected from employer retaliation. Some of the more common
protections include the protection from termination for those
110. For example, the Third Circuit found that the Delaware public policy exception covers
all whistleblowing claims. Paolella v. Browning Ferris, 14 I.E.R. Cases 705 (3d Cir. 1998), even
though State statutes only protect a single class of claims.
111. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Ore. 1975).
112. See, e.g., Patterson v. I.H. Services, Inc., 368 S.E.2d 215 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988), Nees v.
Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Ore. 1975), Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1995).
113. See Haley, supra note 91.
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employees who serve as witnesses before a tribunal (22 states), 4
protected leave for employees to vote (28 states), 5 and re-
employment for those who serve in the military (47 states and the
District of Columbia). 6
B. Implied-in-fact Contracts
Another important "exception" to the employment at will
doctrine is the doctrine of implied-in-fact contract. In cases where an
employer hires an employee at will, but later represents to the
employee either through her actions or words that the employee has
job security, courts have been willing to imply a "for cause" term in
the employment contract. The implied contract exception most often
arises in the context of employee handbooks,"7 though it can arise
anytime there is a document or representation that expresses an intent
to alter the at will status of employment."8 Because implied-in-fact
arguments rely on the representations and reasonable expectations of
the parties they can be thought of more as a less rigid application of
traditional contract principles, rather than as an exception to contract
principles. If a court finds that the employee has been promised for
cause protection, then an arbitrary dismissal will subject the employer
to liability for breach of contract.
The doctrine of implied-in-fact contract rights is almost entirely
found within a jurisdiction's common law. Surprisingly, states appear
very settled on whether rights may arise based on the implied-in-fact
doctrine. Forty-two jurisdictions allow employee rights arising from
implied-in-fact contracts." 9 There has been virtually no change in
state law on this matter in the last ten years. 20 Despite the fact that
the majority of states provide an implied contract exception to the
employment at will doctrine, the exception can be quite limited. First,
114. Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Wyoming. Haley, supra note 91.
115. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Haley, supra note 91.
116. All states and the District of Columbia allow for re-employment of military members
except: Alaska, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Haley, supra note 91.
117. Rosenthal, supra note 89, at 1163.
118. ARIz. REV. STAT. 23-1501.
119. Nine jurisdictions do not allow or have declined to determine whether employee
handbooks give rise to termination rights: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana,
Missouri, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee; Haley, supra note 91.
120. Rosenthal, supra note 89, at 1167 n.64.
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a discharged employee is required to show at the very least the
existence of some statement purporting to alter the at will
relationship. Even if an employee can point to a specific page in an
employment handbook, usually a conspicuous disclaimer anywhere in
the manual releases the employer of liability under the manual.
121
Producing evidence of such a term outside an employment manual
can be extremely difficult.
Second, since the exception is founded in contract law, most
states require the employee show either the employer's intent to be
bound by such a term, or an employee's reasonable reliance on the
employer's representations. In some cases, an employee's mere
knowledge of the terms in the handbook suffice. In Illinois for
example, the manual constitutes an offer and an employee's
knowledge of the terms and act of commencing or continuing services
for the employer constitutes acceptance and consideration. 22 In other
cases, an employee must show the employer intended to be bound by
123the terms, either by the express language of the term, or by some
form of employer conduct.
24
As a result, employers have a great degree of control of their
liability under implied contract. Employers can avoid liability for
implied-in-fact contract terms by avoiding representations or practices
that give rise to expectations of job security and using conspicuous
disclaimers in any employment handbook or policy. Since employee
handbooks are becoming more common means of communicating
expectations between employers and employees,'2 5 an employer's
efforts to maintain many at will employees and maximize profits may
ultimately give rise to enforceable employment rights. Stated
differently, as an employer conducts business, the employer's habits
regarding the discharge of its employees may, at some point, become
enforceable in implied contract, particularly if these habits are
memorialized in writing, and given to the employees.
121. See, e.g., Elliott v. Bd. Of Trs. Of Montgomery County Cmty. Coll., 655 A.2d 46 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
122. Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314 (I11. 1987). The handbook
constitutes an offer, the employee accepts by becoming aware of its contents, and continued
performance constitutes adequate consideration to enforce the handbook terms.
123. See, e.g., Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1983),
Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Campbell, 512 So.2d 725 (Ala. 1987), see also Arizona Employment
Protection Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. 23-1501.
124. Rood v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 507 N.W.2d 591 (Mich 1993) (requiring employer
conduct demonstrating employer's intent to be bound by the policies in the handbook). See also
Bobbitt v. The Orchard Ltd., 603 So.2d 356 (Miss. 1992) (requiring the employer pass the
handbook to all employees before it becomes part of the contract).
125. Verkerke, supra note 13, at 861-69.
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C. Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The third major exception to the at will rule is the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The doctrine arose from
commercial dealings, particularly after the adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), but has recently found application in
employment contracts in some jurisdictions. Under the doctrine,
every contract contains an implicit promise that the parties will treat
each other in ways that comply with general notions of "good faith
and fair dealing." The narrowest rationale for the doctrine is that
neither side to a contract should be able to treat the other in a way
that robs him or her of "the benefit of the bargain." For example,
where the doctrine is accepted it is commonly held that the employer
cannot discharge the employee in order to avoid paying a commission
that has been earned, even though the parties have expressly
contracted for employment at will.126  In such cases the implied
covenant is logically required because allowing the employer to treat
the employee in this way would effectively make the employment
contract a nullity. However, some jurisdictions have applied a
broader theory of the implied covenant requiring that the parties treat
each other in fair and consistent ways, for example not discharging the
employee for doing what he or she was told to do.'27
Currently, twenty-one states imply some form of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts.128 This number
has remained constant for the last ten years.2 9 Nine states recognize a
cause of action for discharge in violation of the implied covenant, 30
while in another six jurisdictions the discharged employee has a cause
126. Frankina v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 801 F. Supp. 875 (D. Mass 1992), 364 N.E.2d
1251 (1991) (terminating an at will employee to avoid paying sales bonuses is bad faith
termination); see also Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985).
127. See Smith v. American Greetings Co., 804 S.W.2d 683 (Ark. 1991); see also Cloutier v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140 (N.H. 1981). In these two states, the good faith
and fair dealing covenant is implied to all employment contracts, but it does not add any extra
protection to employees. Rather, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing overlaps
and justifies the public policy exception. It appears as though the doctrine in these states
provides no new employee protections.
128. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, Wyoming; Haley, supra note 91.
129. Rosenthal, supra note 89, at 1162 n.36.
130. Alabama, Alaska, California, Delaware, Idaho, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oklahoma,
Wyoming. Louisiana has conflicting authority, see Viator v. City of New Iberia, 428 So.2d 1329
(La Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983) (stating that for cause termination is inherent in most employment
contracts). See contra Varnado v. Roadway Express, 557 So.2d 413, 415 (La. Ct. App. 1990)
(denying a cause of action in tort for a claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing). Haley, supra note 91.
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of action to recover the withheld wages or benefits, but has no remedy
for the discharge itself.' Another three jurisdictions limit the use the
good faith and fair dealing doctrine or limit the remedies an afflicted
employee can receive. In Illinois, an employer who violates the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can no longer enforce
any restrictive covenants imposed upon an employee, such as a non-
compete agreement. 3 2 In New York, while the implied covenant itself
is not recognized, professional codes of ethics are implied upon the
employment contract.'33 In South Carolina, the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing only becomes implied when an
employment contract, such as an employee handbook, is implied.'34
Generally speaking, however, a discharged employee's recovery is
limited to contract damages in 18 of the 21 jurisdictions that allow the
cause of action; only four of the jurisdictions allow for tort recovery,
including both compensatory and punitive damages.' The remaining
30 jurisdictions do not recognize the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing at all in the employment context.
IV. CONCLUSION
The rise of the new information technology and the globalization
of the economy have had a profound impact on the employment
relationship in the United States. This transformation of our economy
has contributed to the decline of employee organization in the United
States. As a result, a greater proportion of employees in the United
States are governed under the regime of individual contract that
caters to marginal, rather than average, employee interests.
131. Arizona, Connecticut, Indiana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vermont; Haley, supra note
91. Recall that Arkansas and New Hampshire recognize the doctrine, but it adds nothing more
to the public policy exception, supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
132. In Illinois, there is generally no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Miller
v. Ford Motero Co., 152 F. Supp.2d 1046 (N.D. I11. 2001). However, an employer who discharges
an employee in bad faith or without cause may not also take advantage of restrictive covenants
tied to the employment relationship. Francorp v. Siebert, 126 F. Supp.2d 543 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
133. New York implies professional ethical obligations into the employment relationship
Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992).
134. South Carolina courts take the curious position that an employment relationship that is
not written is not a contract at all. Under this logic, an implied contract can only arise when
there is a valid employment contract, such as an employee handbook. See Keiger v. Citgo, 482
S.E.2d 792 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997), and Shelton v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp, 459 S.E.2d 851 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1995).
135. Alabama allows for both contract and tort recovery. Tort recovery in Alabama is
limited to insurance agreements. The four states that allow tort recovery: Alabama: Grant v.
Butler, 590 So.2d 254 (Ala. 1991) Nevada: Shoen v. Americo Inc., 896 P.2d 469 (Nev. 1995);
Oklahoma: Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985); Wyoming: Loghry v.
Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706 (Wyo. 1996).
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Moreover, this transformation of the economy has undermined union
and employee bargaining power and promoted short-term
employment relationships. Under the new regime, employers demand
greater flexibility in employment practices and greater protection of
their interests in investments and have the bargaining power to
achieve these objectives. Perhaps in response to the rise of employer
power under the new regime of individual contract, courts and
legislatures have developed more exceptions to America's traditional
legal doctrine of employment at will, in order to mitigate the worst
abuses of employer power. With the blessings of the Supreme Court,
employers have recently begun adopting provisions to arbitrate
employment claims under individual agreements to arbitrate.
Our survey of the literature and the available data confirms that
the new regime of individual contract responds to marginal, rather
than average, workers and provides greater protection of employer
interests. First, in general, individual employees do not achieve a
written contract unless the employer has some valuable interest that
she wishes to protect or retain, for example intellectual property or
trade secrets. This stands in sharp contrast to governance of the
workplace under collective agreements, almost all of which are
written. Second, an individual employment contract is much more
likely to specify employment at will than a collective agreement.
Fifty-two percent of individual employment contracts expressly
specify an at will relationship while an additional 33% do not specify a
standard for discipline, resulting in at will relationships under the
default American rule. In contrast, 92% of the collective bargaining
contracts expressly reserve a just cause standard for employee
discipline. Employer discretion under the regime of individual
contract goes beyond the standard for discipline since non-union
workers are less likely to have formal evaluation criteria and seniority
protection. Third, employees are less likely to enjoy fringe benefits
under individual contract than under collective agreement and what
benefits they do enjoy will be tailored more for flexible employment.
Individual employees are less likely to have insurance or a pension
than union employees and will make larger personal contributions to
those benefits even if they have them. Fourth, where written, the
individual employment contract is more likely to allow the employer
to retain intellectual property rights and be free from competition
from the employee after the term of employment. The regime of
individual contract is more likely to protect the employer's interests in
investments in intellectual property and trade secrets than the
employee's interest in job mobility. Finally, since the Supreme
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Court's opinion in Gilmer, the percent of individual employment
contracts specifying employer sponsored arbitration systems as the
means for adjudicating employment disputes has risen from almost
zero to around 20%. Although there may be advantages in cost
savings and accessability under these systems, concerns remain about
the fairness and equity of resolving disputes in this way.
Because the vast majority of employees under individual
employment contracts are employed at will, we included in this essay
a survey of the common law and statutory exceptions to the at will
rule in the jurisdictions of the United States. Although there is broad
acceptance of the at will rule across the United States every
jurisdiction has at least some exceptions. There is little consensus
among the American jurisdictions on the breadth of these exceptions.
Every jurisdiction forbids an employer from discharging an employee
for serving on a jury. Additionally, every state except Georgia forbids
an employer to discharge an employee for refusing to perform an
illegal act. Every state has enacted at least limited protection for
whistleblowers in the last twenty years, perhaps as a result of
corporate scandals that have come to light in that time. Thirty-four
states have enacted legislation that protects all employees from
discharge for reporting employer transgressions, while the remaining
jurisdictions protect certain classes of employees such as government
workers and healthcare providers. State courts are somewhat more
reluctant to grant employees causes of action based on theories of
implied contract. Forty-two jurisdictions allow the cause of action,
while nine jurisdictions do not, and there has been very little change in
the last ten years. However, even if a jurisdiction allows a claim based
on an implied contract, it can be very difficult for the employee to
succeed in court because disclaimers can preserve the employer's at
will defense. A significant minority of American jurisdictions apply
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment
cases. Twenty-one states allow for some form of implied covenant
but, of those, only nine extend the exception to the standard for
discipline and even then, the firing must deny the employee
contractual rights she has already earned. Twelve of the twenty-one
jurisdictions apply the covenant to all employment terms except the
standard for discipline, so a termination in those jurisdictions would
remain valid, but would not deny the employee rights to
compensation, commission, or retirement pensions already earned.
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